This paper deals with the following question associated with congestion pricing in a general network with either fixed or elastic travel demand: what is the maximum efficiency loss of a general second-best pricing scheme due to inexact marginal-cost pricing in comparison with the first-best pricing or system optimum case? A formal answer to this question is provided by establishing an inefficiency bound associated with a given road pricing scheme. An application of the methods is provided for the practical trial-and-error implementation of marginal-cost pricing with unknown demand functions.
INTRODUCTION
Roadway congestion is a source of enormous economic costs. In principle, many of these costs can be prevented, as they result from socially inefficient choices by individual drivers. A number of regions have considered alleviating roadway congestion by introducing congestion pricing. Indeed, road pricing has become one of the priorities on transport policy agendas throughout the world. An increasing number of congestion pricing schemes have been proposed, tested or implemented worldwide. Examples include the US's value pricing scheme, recent EU green and white papers, Dutch initiatives, electronic road pricing schemes in Singapore and Hong Kong, and the London congestion charging scheme that was introduced in February 2003. It is increasingly believed that road pricing may offer an effective instrument to manage travel demand, and to raise revenue that may, for instance, be used for transport improvements, and a new generation of road-use pricing technologies will be widely considered for introduction on many congested road networks.
From a theoretical perspective, road pricing has been a subject of substantial researches for a few decades by transportation economists and scientists. The initial idea of road pricing was put forward by Pigou (1920) , who used the example of a congested road to make points on externalities and optimal congestion charges. Seminal works on both intellectual and practical developments after Pigou's idea include Walters (1961) , Beckmann (1965) , Vickrey (1969) , Dafermos and Sparrow (1971) , Dafermos (1973) and Smith (1979a) . The key objective of road pricing is to achieve an optimal flow distribution pattern, which minimizes the total network travel time in the case of fixed demand, or maximize the total economic benefit in the case of elastic demand, by charging users on congested links in the network. It is widely recognized that the System Optimum (SO) can be decentralized as a Wardropian User Equilibrium (UE) (Wardrop, 1952) , by charging tolls on all links according to the principle of marginal-cost or first-best pricing. The optimal toll on a road link is equal to the difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost, which can internalize the user externalities and thus achieve a SO flow pattern in the network (Yang and Huang, 1998) . It is also recognized that, in spite of its perfect theoretical basis, the first-best pricing scheme is of little practical interest. The problem stems from the fact that it is impractical to charge users on each network link in view of the operating cost and public acceptance. Due to the imperfection of the first-best pricing from a political and technical implementation perspective, the second-best charging schemes are more practically relevant, and indeed have received ample attention recently. A wide variety of second-best pricing schemes in general networks are developed to determine the optimal tolls for system performance optimization, under given physical and economic pricing constraints. Readers are suggested to refer to Yang and Huang (2005) and Lawphongpanich et al. (2006) for recent comprehensive treatments of the first-best and second-best pricing problems in general networks.
Among the various social, economic and technical issues associated with congestion pricing in general traffic networks, the following question is of particular interest here: what is the maximum efficiency loss of a general second-best pricing scheme due to inexact marginalcost pricing in comparison with the first-best pricing or system optimum case? Clearly, a formal answer to this question should prove to be very important and meaningful for design and evaluation of actual pricing schemes in the presence of pricing constraints.
In this paper we make a full investigation of the posted questions in the spirit of 'price of anarchy', a term that was first dubbed and used recently for bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in non-atomic congestion games (Papadimitriou, 2001) . The price of anarchy for a non-atomic congestion game is determined by looking for the worst possible ratio between the total cost incurred by players in an equilibrium situation and in an outcome of minimumpossible total cost or system optimum; it has been examined by, for example, Roughgarden (2003) , Chau and Sim (2003) , Roughgarden and Tardos (2004) , Perakis (2004) , and Correa et al. (2004 Correa et al. ( , 2005 . It is suggested that readers refer to Roughgarden (2005) for a recent comprehensive review of this emerging research subject.
The paper is organized below. In next section, we present our bounding results of the efficiency loss in terms of total system travel time minimization for an arbitrary congestion pricing scheme with fixed demand; we show that our new bounding formula can generate the existing results of price of anarchy for self-routing in the special case of zero pricing, and lead to zero efficiency loss or maximum efficiency gain in the special case of first-best pricing. In Section 3, we extend the bounding methods to the general congestion pricing scheme with elastic demand using social welfare as a system performance measure. In Section 4, we propose and discuss briefly an alternative bounding approach to the problems of interest. In Section 5, we provide an application of the proposed efficiency bounding methods for the practical trial-and-error implementation of the congestion pricing problem with unknown demand functions. General conclusions and suggestions for further researches are given in Section 6. (Sheffi, 1985) : 
EFFICIENCY GAIN AND LOSS OF PRICING WITH FIXED DEMAND
Alternatively, the UE problem can be formulated as the following equivalent Variational Inequalities (VI) in terms of link flow variables (Smith, 1979b; Dafermos, 1980) . Find
t v is continuous and monotonically increasing in a v , then there exists a unique link flow solution, ( ) ue , v u for given pricing scheme 0. u ≥ Then the total system travel time at UE under a pricing scheme u is given by
On the other hand, the standard SO model that minimizes the total system travel time is given by 
where ' fd ' denotes the case of fixed demand. Clearly, 
denotes the derivative of link cost function in link flow.
Therefore, one may regard
as the relative efficiency loss associated with a general second-best pricing scheme u in comparison with the first-best one mc u . This efficiency loss also determines the room or potential for further improvement of the second-best pricing scheme per se.
If 0, u = then the ratio ( ) ue fd 0 u u = ρ in (6) becomes the measure of the inefficiency or price of anarchy of the selfish user equilibria (Roughgarden, 2005) . This ratio can also be regarded as the efficiency gain of a marginal-cost pricing scheme, because, as already mentioned, it can drive a UE flow pattern to the system optimal one, or completely remove the inefficiency of selfish user equilibria.
Bound for Efficiency Gain and Loss
Our purpose here is to find an upper bound of ( ) ue fd u ρ for a given pricing scheme , u thereby quantifying the maximum efficiency loss of the second-best pricing scheme u . As a special case, such a bound will naturally give the maximum efficiency gain that can be achieved through a first-best pricing scheme in comparison with the non-tolling case, as just mentioned. In a similar spirit of Correa et al. (2005) 
Here, 0 0 0 = by convention, the reason for using the two different definitions (10) and
(11) is given later in Remark 2. Because the denominator in (10) is fixed, our task here is to solve the following one-dimensional maximization problem for a v :
Note that it is assumed that ( ) t v , and the right hand side is less than or equal to ( ) ( ) Figure 2 . Geometric illustration of the solution to equation (13) Next, we briefly examine the case of ( ) 
Clearly, this function is continuously differentiable for 0 a v > and has the properties that 
In addition, the derivative of the right hand side in (15) is
There is a unique solution to eqn. (15). Thus one can conclude that there exists one unique (14) For a given class C of link cost functions (for example, a family of linear cost functions or polynomials of a certain degree) and a pricing scheme u with
With this definition, the following theorem follows immediately.
be a UE link flow pattern associated with a pricing scheme u , with separable link cost functions drawn from a given class C , and let so v be an SO link flow solution, then
Proof: The proof is similar to Correa et al. (2005) in the absence of toll pricing. We consider the case of ( ) (10) and (16) 
Theorem 1 simply states that, for the UE problem with fixed demand under a pricing scheme u , we have: Note that the bounding formulas (17) and (18) assume that the toll charge is either uniformly less (or greater) than the corresponding congestion externality for all links in the network. It is obviously unrealistic in practice. Toll charge for a link in a network can be either less or greater than the corresponding congestion externality in a second-best pricing scheme, such as the sequential experimental pricing scheme to be considered later. It is therefore necessary to establish an inefficiency bound for general second-best pricing schemes that can accommodate both possibilities. To do this, we now consider the following relaxation for the inefficiency bounding.
Let 1
A and 2 A be the link sets consisting of those links whose toll charges are less than and greater than their congestion externalities, respectively (10) and (11) 
As before, using definition (6) and let
To sum up, we state the following Theorem.
Note that the above general results in Theorem 2 depend on the specific instance, because they depend on the toll and the marginal cost in each link. We next look at the special case with a class of BPR (Bureau of Public Road) link cost functions and show how the bound result in this case can get ride of the dependence of the network topology.
Bound with BPR Link Cost Functions
For a given positive integer p , let p C denote the set of the following convex BPR-type cost function that is widely used in road traffic assignment 
Note that a p t ∈C is dropped in (35) because the term to be maximized becomes independent of specific cost functions in the class with the same number 
where the inequality holds for any positive value of numerator and 0 0 
where a p t ∈C is again dropped from the second "max" for the same reason for (35).
If we further assume that the second-best pricing scheme, u , is chosen such that a κ ≡ κ for all , a A ∈ then finally we arrive at 
We thus have the same result of the price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion game with polynomial link cost functions established in the literature (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002) (here it should be noted that Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) considered general polynomials with nonnegative coefficients and degree at most p , rather than monomials of degree p plus a constant considered above). If we further assume that 1 p = in (41) (21) and (22), the relative efficiency loss in relation to the system optimum, associated with u , is given by
is given by (40) for the class of BPR-type link cost function p C . 
EFFICIENCY GAIN AND LOSS OF PRICING WITH ELASTIC DEMAND

Traffic Equilibria and Inefficiency Measure
Suppose the OD demand is a function of the equilibrium OD travel time or cost between that OD pair (for simplicity, we consider separable demand functions only), namely function, which can be regarded as an amount that a user is willing to pay for his or her travel (inclusive of toll charge if any), or a benefit that he or she can obtain from this travel. In this case, the following social welfare (or net economic benefit) can serve as a meaningful system performance measure (Yang and Huang, 1998) : 
and the elastic demand SO formulation is given by:
where Δ and Λ are the link/path and OD/path incidence matrix, respectively. 
where ' ed ' denotes the case of elastic demand. Clearly, The price of anarchy with elastic demand was examined by Chau and Sim (2003) in the absence of toll pricing. Here we first use a simple example to show that finding the bound of ue ed ρ in the elastic demand case is not as manageable as in the fixed demand case, even if all functions of the system are linear (see, Chau and Sim, 2003 , with errors corrected here). 
Unlike the bounded for the fixed demand case ( 4 3 for linear cost function), there is no deterministic upper bound independent of . m In the fixed demand case, the price of anarchy of the UE is not too severe since it is bounded, and thus the efficiency gain of the marginalcost pricing is mild. However, in the presence of elastic demand, as considered in this simple example of a linear setting, the price of anarchy of an elastic-demand UE can be dramatic if 0 m → regardless of the value of parameter a (it can be easily checked that in this case the elasticity of demand becomes ' −∞ ' or the demand becomes perfectly elastic).
Bound for Efficiency Gain and Loss
In what follows, we attempt to derive a pseudo-approximation bound of ue ed ρ in terms of the social welfare and user benefit at a given user optimum solution and the parameter ( ) ,u γ C established in previous section. Then, we consider how to obtain a relaxed upper bound that depends on the class of link cost functions and the demand elasticity only to get ride of the specific demand functions. The relaxed upper bound will suffice for us to determine the welfare gap between a second-best pricing scheme and the system optimum (or the first-best pricing scheme), the gap will completely disappear as the second-best pricing scheme approaches the first-best one. We first introduce the following lemma (Chau and Sim, 2003 (10) and (16) 
Using definition (49) (56) and (57), respectively.
Proof: Like the proof of Theorem 3 and using the relation (27), the counterpart of eqn.
(60) or (61) becomes
Using definition (49) and let ( ) ( ) 
Selection of Practical Bounding Parameter Values
For calculation of the inefficiency bounds established above, we have to ascertain the values of parameter 
where 0 α > is a cost sensitivity parameter and 0 μ is the minimum free-flow travel time and 0 d is the maximum demand when 0 . μ = μ
The inverse demand function is given by 0 0
The user benefit, , U is given by
and, in the absence of pricing, the social welfare, S , is given by
be the ratio of the user benefit to social welfare for any ( ) 
In practice, the demand function is usually unknown. In this case, if parameters, ( ) 
for any limited values of ( ) the convergence of a sequential experimental pricing scheme or the nearness of a given current second-best pricing scheme to the first-best one in its neighborhood, can still be well understood, without requiring the specific demand functions. The following lemma is useful for gauging a practical value of ω.
Lemma 2 If the demand function
inclusive of toll charge, if any, is monotonically decreasing and convex, then
where U and S denotes the user benefit and social welfare for any realized ( )
Proof: Consider Figure 5 , where T td = denotes the total travel time cost with t being the travel time, R ud = denotes the toll revenue with u being the toll charge, and CS denotes the consumer surplus (or net user benefit) given by the area under the demand curve and above the line segment ab . 
at any realized ( ) ,d μ for any monotonically decreasing and convex demand function and any pricing scheme . u As we have seen from the proof, the upper bound is exactly matched for linear demand functions without pricing.
Example 4 Consider again Example 3 with negative exponential demand function (65). Applying the formula of the price elasticity of demand yields ( ) Case 2: UE located on the left-hand side of SO. This case is shown in Figure 6 ( 
Then we do not need to do further relaxation as previously in (27). Instead, in the same spirit as before, we have the following straightforward results by reference to Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
i)
The bound for traffic equilibria with fixed demand:
ii)
The bound for traffic equilibria with elastic demand
Here, to find the value of ( )
the key problem is still to determine the maximum of the following function for given a u : 
Any analytical solution for ( ) max a F v is difficult, if not impossible, even for the specific polynomial cost functions examined in the previous section. developed an efficient and practical trial-and-error implementation scheme of the first-best marginal-cost pricing problem when the demand function is unknown, as is generally the case in practice. The central idea of the scheme is to adjust the link toll charges in a sequential manner, by observing and comparing the users' responses (observed aggregate link flows) and the intended or targeted flow levels adopted for determination of toll charges. An exact first-best or marginal-cost pricing scheme is ensured if the observed and targeted link flows match each other. Specifically, the sequential experimental pricing scheme and its convergence property can be described below . 
APPLICATION TO PRACTICAL PRICING SCHEMES
Sequential
Theorem 5 then the sequential experimental pricing scheme generates the link flows and link tolls with the following convergence property:
Theorem 5 simply states that the link tolls determined through the sequential pricing experiments converge to the first-best, marginal-cost pricing link tolls that give rise to the SO link flows, as the number of trials goes to infinity. Nevertheless, because the actual number of pricing trials could be very limited, one could end up with an inexact marginal-cost, or a second-best, pricing scheme. In this case, it is vital to determine the bound of the inefficiency or welfare loss of the current link toll pattern, thereby assessing whether or not further pricing experiments are needed.
The desirable inefficiency bound can be easily calculated using the bounding method developed in previous sections, with no more than the information needed for the pricing experiment itself. What are needed are the individual link cost functions, the current link toll charges and the easily available link flows observed after implementing the pricing scheme.
Let ( ) We now illustrate application of the inefficiency bounding methods for the trial-and-error pricing scheme with unknown demand functions developed in . Consider the same example used in , with the network shown in Figure 7 . The OD demand functions are given below: The BPR link cost function (85) is used with the input data given in Table 1 . We consider bounding the efficiency loss for the inexact marginal-cost pricing schemes in the sequential experimental pricing process for the elastic demand case with the above demand functions. The sequential pricing experiment starts with an initial un-tolled UE link flow pattern, using a sequence of ( ) The bounding results are shown in Figure 8 , together with the actual efficiency loss. Note that the actual efficiency loss and the bound with the actual value of ω become known only if the demand functions are known and they are presented in the figure for comparative analysis. With appropriate a priori values of , ω one can see that the bounds established with unknown demand functions are effective and indeed useful. It tells us whether a sufficiently good approximate marginal-cost pricing scheme is already found, without resorting to demand functions. Indeed, irrespective of the chosen value of parameter ω, the actual and the maximum relative welfare gaps given by the formula all approach zero as the experiment continues and the tolls under trial reach the optimum, although the inter-medium bounds depend on its specific values. It is worthwhile to note that the bound with the actual ω is located in between the bounds for 1.5 ω = and 2.0. ω = This confirms our early observation that the practical ω value is within the range of 1.0 2.25. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we examined the efficiency loss of a second-best congestion pricing scheme in general networks due to inexact marginal-cost pricing, with either fixed or elastic demand. We established the upper bound of the efficiency loss of a given congestion pricing scheme in the spirit of 'price of anarchy' that appeared in recent literature for bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in non-atomic congestion games. We show that our new bounding formula can generate the existing price of anarchy results for self-routing in the special case of zero pricing, and lead to zero efficiency loss or maximum efficiency gain in the special case of first-best marginal-cost pricing. In the general case of any given second-best pricing scheme, the inefficiency bound can be calculated with limited information. An application of the proposed inefficiency bounding methods is provided to assess the accuracy of inexact marginal-cost pricing in the sequential experimental pricing process with unknown demand functions developed previously.
We acknowledge that the method developed in this study is restricted to the standard traffic equilibrium problem, it can be further extended in a few manners: 1) to generalize the results to the case of non-separable and asymmetric link cost and OD demand functions (Perakis, 2004) ; 2) to extend the bounding method to the general traffic restraint and road pricing problem in capacitated networks (Yang and Bell, 1997; Correla et al., 2004) ; and 3) to bound the efficiency of second-best anonymous toll patterns for multiclass-user transportation networks (Yang and Huang, 2004) .
